美 외교전문지 디플로매트 "일본은 윤석열 정부 믿지 않아"

 

 

美 외교전문지 디플로매트 "일본은 윤석열 정부 믿지 않아"

뉴스버스 이상연 기자    / 입력 2023.04.07 10:33

 

디플로매트, 한일정상회담 이후 한·일관계 진단

디플로매트 "한·일 화해 결국 파국 치달을 것" 경고

"일본, 강경 자세로 원하는 결과 얻어...다음 정권 등장 걱정"

 

"윤석열 대통령과 기시다 총리가 한일 화해의 기회를 놓치고 있다(Yoon and Kishida are fumbling South Korea-Japan rapprochement)".

미국의 대표적 외교 전문지인 '디플로매트(Diplomat)'가 최근 오피니언을 통해 한국의 주도로 진행되고 있는 한일 화해가 결국은 파국으로 치달을 것이라고 예상해 주목받고 있다.


윤석열 대통령과 기시다 후미오 일본 총리가 지난 3월 16일 도쿄 긴자의 한 오므라이스 노포에서 맥주를 들고 건배를 하고 있다. (사진=대통령실)
한국외국어대 국제지역대학원(GSIAS) 조엘 앳킨슨 교수는 지난 24일 기고를 통해 "좌파 성향의 문재인 대통령 임기 중 전투적인 관계를 유지했던 한일 양국의 관계가 보수세력 집권으로 긴밀한 협력이 가능해질 것으로 예상됐다"면서 "윤 대통령이 지난달 일본을 방문해 기시다 후미오 총리와 회담을 가지면서 잠시 세계의 주목을 받을 수 있었다"고 전했다.

앳킨슨 교수는 이어 "한국과 일본이 모두 미국의 동맹국이지만 한국 국민의 대다수는 일본과 북한 사이에 전쟁이 일어나면 북한을 지지할 것"이라며 "하지만 트럼프 대통령과 김정은 위원장의 정상회담 이후에도 아무것도 변하지 않았고, 북한이 여전히 미사일을 발사하고 긴장을 고조시키고 있어 일본과의 협력 필요성이 커졌다"고 분석했다.

그에 따르면 이같은 변화가 아직 일본에 대한 한국 국민들의 태도를 확실히 바꾸지는 못했지만, 북한에 대해 더욱 강경한 노선을 취하는 한편 일본과의 군사 협력을 개선하는 문제에 대해 둔감하게 만들었다.

앳킨슨 교수는 "또한 한국을 전혀 존중하지 않는 중국의 태도 때문에 한국 국민들은 일본의 무례한 태도에 상대적으로 덜 민감하게 반응하는 측면도 있다"면서 "또한 푸틴의 우크라이나 침공과 미국의 지원은 한국 국민들에게 안보 문제에 대한 경각심을 일깨워 미국과의 동맹이 중요하다는 인식을 불러일으켰다"고 지적했다. 이를 계기로 윤 대통령은 좌파를 자극하지 않고 일본의 군사적 반격(counterstrike) 능력을 수용하는 분위기를 만들고 있다는 것이다.

그는 "윤석열 정부는 정치적 손해를 감수하면서 2차대전 당시 일본 기업이 행한 강제징용 책임을 묻지 않겠다고 밝힌 뒤, 일본 정부가 이에 호응하는 모습을 보일 것을 기대했다"면서 "이는 1945년 이전 역사에 대한 일본 정부의 새롭고 분명한 사과와 강제징용 피해자에 대한 자발적인 보상, 한국에 유리한 경제적 혜택 등을 포함하고 있다"고 설명했다. 이어 "한국 정부는 미국이 밀어붙이는 반도체법과 인플레이션감축법(IRA) 협상에서 미국과 밀접한 관계인 일본 정부가 한국의 입장을 옹호해주기를 기대하고 있다"고 덧붙였다.

한국 측의 거듭된 요청과 증가하고 있는 중국의 위협에도 불구하고 일본은 이같은 기대에 전혀 부응하지 않고 있다. 앳킨슨 교수는 이에 대해 "도쿄(기시다 정부)가 서울(윤석열 정부)을 신뢰하지 못할(untrustworthy) 상대로 여기고 있기 때문"이라면서 일본 정부가 이미 다음 한국 정권의 등장을 우려하고 있다고 지적했다.

그는 "일본은 '한국에 양보를 했는데 다음 한국 정권이 윤석열 정부의 약속을 뒤집으면 더욱 나쁜 상황에 노출될 것'으로 보고 있다"면서 "일본 정부는 (한국에) 강경한 태도를 취해 자신들이 원하는 결과를 얻었기 때문에 (윤석열 정부에) 빨리 양보하는 것은 실수라고 믿고 있다"고 결론내렸다.

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Yoon and Kishida Are Fumbling South Korea-Japan Rapprochement 

With Yoon and Kishida less than ideal midwives to a new relationship, there’s a real need for Washington to help move things along.

By Joel Atkinson

March 24, 2023

 

 

In this photo provided by Japan’s Cabinet Public Affairs Office, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, left, and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio make a toast at Rengatei restaurant in the Ginza district of Tokyo, Mar. 16, 2023.

Credit: Japan’s Cabinet Public Affairs Office via AP

 

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol managed to briefly get the world’s attention last week when he traveled to Japan for talks (and beers) with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. Relations under the previous left-leaning President Moon Jae-in were openly combative, with Moon not visiting Japan bilaterally during his term. So this summit sent a strong signal that with conservatives in power in Seoul, both sides would now be cooperating much more closely.

 

That’s big news. South Koreans typically have very negative views about former colonizer and neighbor Japan. Despite South Korea and Japan both being U.S. allies, some polls have even showed a majority of South Koreas saying they would support Pyongyang over Tokyo in a war between the two.

 

But there’s been something of a national vibe shift. Scenes of North Korea’s Kim Jong Un crossing the DMZ and joining Moon for hugs, talks, dinner and festivities in 2018 were met with enthusiastic optimism. There was real buzz, for example, around the prospect of South Koreans soon being able to take a train to Europe. But the Korean public has now seen that whole process play out, with Kim’s summits with Donald Trump and everything else, and nothing has changed. The Kim regime is still firing off missiles and raising tensions.

 

Accordingly, the public became more supportive of taking a tougher line toward the North. This is not enough to push the public toward seeing Japan that much more positively, but it has created some apathy toward improving security cooperation with Japan. Now, Yoon can show some understanding of Japan’s need for “counterstrike” capabilities in the face of the threat from the North, without it becoming a cudgel for the South Korean left.

 

China is perhaps the even more significant push factor.  Attitudes toward China are at rock bottom. Much of that is due to a perception that Beijing is not treating South Korea with respect. That makes disrespect coming from Japan relatively less salient. Koreans have also been repulsed by what has happened in Hong Kong and are taking note of Beijing’s threatening approach to Taiwan.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin and the people of Ukraine also deserve a lot of credit for the shift* in Korean attitudes. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has Koreans thinking seriously about security, and Ukraine’s heroic resistance with U.S. support has inspired new appreciation for liberal democracy and the U.S. alliance.

Koreans are still worried about the economic implications of bad relations with China, and there is still skepticism toward U.S. motives. But overall, the growing anxiety around China is making both policymakers and the public more open to rapprochement with Japan.

 

Still, reaching out to Japan is far from easy. Burning through considerable political capital, Seoul has agreed that Japanese companies being directly liable for wartime forced labor compensation is off the table. After reaching the limit of what it can do, Seoul now hopes Tokyo will step up. This might take the form of a new, clearer apology for the pre-1945 history, voluntary payments to forced labor victims, or some kind of economic arrangement favorable to South Korea. It could even be Japan using its leverage in Washington to push for an expanded role for South Korea in international forums, or Korea-friendly concessions related to the CHIPS and Science Act or the Inflation Reduction Act.

 

These expectations are not being matched the Japanese side. Tokyo is without doubt extremely concerned about China’s combination of growing military muscle and “dare to struggle” approach to foreign policy under Xi Jinping. But that didn’t make Japan willing to compromise over compensation claims.

Tokyo appears to have settled on a view of Seoul as untrustworthy. The thinking seems to be that if Japan makes any concessions now, the next Korean president won’t keep the ball rolling, and Tokyo will be left exposed and worse off. There’s also likely a belief that taking a tough approach got results and therefore conceding too much, too quickly would be a mistake.

 

This displays a worrying lack of strategic self-mastery in Tokyo. Before World War I, the British leadership put aside their deeply felt antipathy toward the French and Russians to focus on the rising German naval threat. In contrast to the “sharp discipline” the British displayed then, Tokyo is waiting for Seoul to do the work: a much easier — and much more dangerous — game.

 

Still, as long as the pressure from Beijing continues to rise, there will be increasing impetus to find a way out of the zero sum struggle over pride and humiliation the two countries are locked in. But it will be a long, fitful process.

Yoon doesn’t have the power to single-handedly re-orient South Korea’s approach to Japan. It would be an achievement even just to get cooperation back to where it was before the Moon administration, and then have it stay there after Yoon’s term ends in 2027.

Yoon’s visit is actually counterproductive in this respect. Instead of drawing the Korean public’s attention to the relationship, he should’ve gone anywhere but Japan after the announcement on compensation. Ideally, he would have gone to Europe to be feted as a statesman and sign major export deals — even visit Ukraine. Meanwhile, Washington would be publicizing concessions on the IRA and CHIPS Act, preferably even a little at Japan’s expense.

That doesn’t mean Yoon’s government shouldn’t be explaining the rationale of why it is important to move forward with Japan. But standing next to Kishida after having made a major concession is the singularly worst place to do it.

 

And if Yoon had to go to Japan now, he should have eaten Korean beef at a Zainichi Korean restaurant, not Japanese omurice. Instead of photos of beer glasses, we should’ve seen the two men visiting a Korean Japanese school together. Kishida should be showing the Korean people that Yoon’s outreach is being reciprocated. Instead, the poor optics just add to the impression that Yoon is making a one-sided concession. It makes it that much easier for the left to attach the pungent stigma of pro-Japan flunkeyism to the whole thing.

 

With Yoon and Kishida less than ideal midwives to a new relationship, there’s a real need for Washington to help move things along. Unfortunately, the Biden administration doesn’t seem to have any idea of how to do that beyond publicly praising it. This only further draws Korean public attention to it, and brings with it all the baggage of subservience to the United States.

 

Ironically then, whether this visit represents a new era of cooperation depends more on what happens in Beijing and Pyongyang than anywhere else. It is China’s and North Korea’s continued ratcheting up of a sense of shared threat that brings the two sides together — in spite of the underwhelming leadership in Seoul and Tokyo.

 

GUEST AUTHOR

Joel Atkinson

Joel Atkinson is a professor in the Graduate School of International and Area Studies (GSIAS) at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, South Korea, where he researches and teaches East Asian international politics.